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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND THE 
STANDARD HF APPffT.T.ATE REVIEW 
(1) Whether the trial court erred in adding Salt Lake 
City Corporation, a non-party to the action, to the Special 
Verdict Form for purposes of allowing the jury to apportion 
the City's fault under Utah's comparative negligence 
statute. The trial court's statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law that is accorded no particular 
deference and is reviewed for correctness. Asay v. Watkins, 
751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988) . 
(2) Whether the Plaintiff was prejudiced by the trial 
court's refusal to allow Plaintiff to call a proper rebuttal 
witness at trial. The trial court's rulings on the 
admission or exclusion of evidence are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 - 78-27-41 (1992): 
78-27-37. Definitions. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant means any person not immune from suit 
who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any 
person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal 
duty, act or omission proximately causing or 
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person 
seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, 
negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express 
or implied warranty of a product, products liability, 
and misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person 
seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or 
on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act 
as legal representative. 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any 
defendant or group of defendants whose fault exceeds 
his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person 
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the 
proportion of fault attributable that defendant. 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages 
and proportion of fault. 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party 
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate 
special verdicts determining the total amount of 
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery and 
to each defendant. 
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of 
fault—No contribution. 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the 
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is 
entitled to contribution from any other person. 
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a 
party to the litigation, may join as parties any 
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damages for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective 
proportions of fault. 
gTATKMKNT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/Appellant Julie Anderson Turner ("Turner") 
sued Defendant/Appellee Amy Nelson ("Nelson") in March, 
1991, alleging negligence for injuries she received July 6, 
1989 when Nelson ran a stop sign and collided with Turner's car. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Nelson answered Turner's complaint on April 12, 1991 
and denied that she was negligent, and further alleged that 
Turner's injuries were caused by the negligence of third 
parties. Discovery ensued. At her deposition July 2, 1991, 
Nelson testified that the stop sign she ran was "partially 
covered" by trees. She confessed, however, that her memory 
was a bit vague concerning the facts surrounding the 
collision. 
Discovery was concluded by court order on February 20, 
1992 and trial was set for March 3, 1992. On February 26, 
1992, Nelson asked the trial court to add Salt Lake City to 
the special verdict form for the purpose of having the jury 
consider and apportion a non-party's (Salt Lake City) 
alleged fault for Turner's injuries. On the morning of the 
first day of trial the court granted Nelson's motion. The 
jury found no fault on the part of Nelson, and judgment was 
entered against Turner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 6, 1989, Turner was driving westbound on Third 
Avenue near its intersection with Canyon Road in Salt Lake 
City. (R. 3). Nelson had just dropped her boyfriend off at 
the airport and was headed up Canyon Road to look at houses 
before going to work. (R. 324-26). Nelson had never been on 
Canyon Road before. (R. 325). 
Nelson proceeded north on Canyon Road. (R. 326). She 
failed to heed the "Stop Ahead" warning sign on the road (R. 
-3-
326), and then ran the stop sign at the corner of Canyon 
Road and Third Avenue. Nelson hit Turner's car in the front 
left quarter panel. 
Salt Lake City Police Officer Mickey Paul was the first 
officer to arrive at the scene of the accident. (R. 432). 
Officer Paul neither observed nor noted any obstruction of 
the stop sign at that intersection. (R. 434). No indication 
of any obstruction appeared on the official report filed by 
the investigating officer. (R. 397). Neither Nelson nor 
Daniel Rusk, an eyewitness, ever told the investigating 
officer that the stop sign was obstructed. (R. 329, 645). 
Turner's complaint was served on Nelson March 27, 1991. 
(R. 6-8). Nelson answered the complaint on April 12, 1991, 
and denied any negligence (R. 9-13). Nelson claimed that 
Turner was contributorily negligent, and further alleged 
that Turner's injuries were caused by the negligence of 
unspecified third parties. Id. 
Discovery commenced and on July 2, 1991, Nelson was 
deposed. (R. 16). During her deposition, Nelson claimed 
that the stop sign had been ''partially obstructed," but 
testified that she had seen the stop sign prior to entering 
the intersection and hitting Turner's car. (R. 331-32). 
On December 12, 1991, the trial court issued a 
scheduling order setting February 20, 1992 as the discovery 
cutoff and March 3, 1992 as the trial date. (R. 68). On 
February 26, 1992, Nelson filed a "Motion for Apportionment 
of Fault of Salt Lake City" and accompanying brief. (R. 100-
-4-
101; 112-18). Nelson sought a hearing on her Motion the 
morning of the first day of trial. (R. 119). Turner filed 
an objection to the motion. (R. 135-38). The trial court 
granted the motion without argument. (R. 357-58). 
After the court granted Nelson's Motion, trial began. 
In his opening statement, Nelson's counsel began his attack 
on the City in absentia: 
I think the real fault here that — we're suggesting is 
with Salt Lake City. It's a bad design. They didn't 
have it well signed. 
(R. 376). 
That evening, Turner's counsel set out to find a 
witness to rebut Nelson's attack upon the non-party City. 
Counsel discovered Mr. Jim Nakling, a resident of the Canyon 
Road/Third Avenue area for 10 years. Mr. Nakling was 
prepared to testify that he had walked his dog by that 
intersection, twice daily, and that the stop sign was not 
obstructed by trees or foliage at the time of the accident, 
nor at any time since. (R. 148). 
The morning of the second day of trial, counsel filed a 
motion seeking permission to call Mr. Nakling at trial. (R. 
143-45). The motion was accompanied by the affidavit of 
counsel and relevant case law supporting the motion. (R. 
146-48, 150-60). 
On the third day of trial, counsel called Mr. Nakling 
as a rebuttal witness. The court refused to allow the 
rebuttal evidence. (R. 744). Counsel then proffered Mr. 
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Nakling's testimony, arguing that the testimony was proper 
rebuttal and was critical to the fair presentation of the 
case to the jury. Counsel also sought a continuance of the 
trial in order to allow Nelson to depose Nakling if she 
desired. (R. 745). The court denied the request, and 
refused to allow the rebuttal evidence. Id. 
Nelson's primary attack in her closing argument was 
upon the absent City for causing the accident. (R. 775). 
The jury returned a verdict of no negligence on the part of 
Nelson, from which Turner appeals. (R. 792). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41 
mandates that a defendant be joined as a party before her 
negligence can be considered by the trier of fact. The 
policy considerations underlying the Act and the 
Legislature's statutory scheme support this interpretation. 
I would like to proffer a Mr. Jim Nakling—and I found his 
name is spelled N-a-k-1-i-n-g, and he resides at 122 North 
Canyon Road, one house away from the stop sign, and his 
testimony is that for the past 10 years he has walked his 
dogs past that stop sign two times per day on a usual day 
and he has never seen any obstruction of that stop sign. 
The tree to which it is alleged obstructed of the stop sign 
has never been cut. The tree in front of his house has 
never been cut in the past 10 years that he's been there and 
furthermore, the stop sign has never been changed and he's 
never observed it bent during the past seven or eight years. 
He will further testify that the stop ahead sign which is 
somewhat in dispute as to when it placed there, he will 
testify that that stop ahead sign has been there, as has the 
stop sign, since the road was repaired after the floods of 
1983, so this is all of the testimony that I think is 
essential that this witness would testify about. (R. 
746)(emphasis supplied). 
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Restricting the apportionment of negligence to parties 
to an action is wholly consistent with, and substantially 
furthers, the policies of judicial economy and fairness to 
the parties to the litigation. It encourages the joinder of 
all potentially responsible tortfeasors into the initial 
litigation, which in turn ensures that no named defendant 
will be liable for more than her share of fault* It further 
prevents multiple and successive litigation by plaintiffs 
seeking to bind "ghost" tortfeasors legally for acts for 
which a jury finds them theoretically responsible. 
Nelson provided no adequate explanation either for 
failing to add the City when she uniquely possessed 
knowledge of the City's potential negligence, or for her 
failure to notify the trial court and Turner of her 
intention to add the City to the special verdict form until 
six days before trial. Nelson's motion to add the City, 
made less than a week before trial, and the trial court's 
addition of the City the day of trial was manifestly unfair 
and prejudicial to Turner, and constituted an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion• 
The rebuttal evidence proffered by Turner at trial was 
clearly proper rebuttal evidence calculated to meet new 
evidence and the newly added "party" at trial. Under the 
facts and circumstances of the case, the court's denial of 
Turner's rebuttal evidence was manifestly unfair and 
patently prejudicial, and constituted a clear abuse of 
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discretion. The court's ruling should be reversed, and the 
case should be remanded for a new trial. 
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ADDITION OF A NON-PARTY TO THE 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
The court below permitted Salt Lake City Corporation 
(the "City"), a non-party to the action, to be added to the 
special verdict form the day of trial for the purpose of 
apportioning the City's alleged negligence. The court's 
ruling was based upon an erroneous interpretation of Utah's 
Liability Reform Act, and was unjust, inequitable and 
prejudicial. The court's ruling should be reversed and 
remanded for retrial in accordance with the plain language 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41 and Utah's Liability Reform 
Act. 
A. THE STATUTORY SCHEME AND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 
78-27-41 PRECLUDES THE APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT TO 
NON-PARTIES 
This appeal presents a question of first impression in 
Utah concerning the proper interpretation of Utah's 
Liability Reform Act. The Utah Legislature passed the 
Liability Reform Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 
- 42, in 1986. The Act eliminated contributory negligence, 
joint and several liability and contribution between 
tortfeasors, and established a pure comparative negligence 
system under which no defendant is liable for more than her 
respective share of fault. 
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In passing the Act, the Legislature made an express and 
deliberate policy decision to place the burden upon the 
party seeking to have the negligence of nonparties 
considered to join any and all other potentially negligent 
tortfeasors as parties to the action in order to have those 
tortfeasors' negligence, if any, considered. The plain 
language of the Act, the policy considerations underlying 
the statutory scheme chosen by the Utah Legislature and the 
statutory scheme itself all reflect the Legislature's 
considered decision not to permit the apportionment of 
negligence to non-parties to an action. 
Restricting the. apportionment of negligence to parties 
is wholly consistent with, and substantially furthers, the 
policies of judicial economy and fairness to the parties to 
the litigation. It encourages the joinder of all 
potentially responsible tortfeasors into the initial 
litigation, which in turn ensures that no named defendant 
will be liable for more than her share of fault. It further 
prevents multiple and successive litigation by plaintiffs 
seeking to bind "ghost" tortfeasors legally for acts for 
which a jury has found them theoretically responsible. 
1. The Plain Language of the Act 
The Act begins by defining the three key terms under 
the Act: "defendant," "fault" and "person seeking 
recovery." It then provides: 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any 
defendant or group of defendants whose fault exceeds 
-9-
his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person 
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the 
proportion of fault attributable that defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1992)(emphasis supplied). The 
Act defines a "defendant" as "any person not immune from 
suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any 
person seeking recovery." Id. § 78-27-37. A "person seeking 
recovery" under the Act is "any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for 
whom it is authorized to act as legal representative." Id. 
Defendant is thus defined more broadly in the Act than 
its customary usage,2 and there is no requirement that 
either a defendant or a person seeking recovery be a party 
to the action.3 A defendant1s liability to a person 
seeking recovery under the Act is limited to the proportion 
of the total damages equal to that defendant's fault. Id. § 
78-27-40. The Act provides for separate special verdicts 
determining the amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage of fault attributable to each person seeking 
recovery and to each defendant. Id. § 78-27-39. 
Read together, nothing in these sections appears to 
prohibit the consideration of any alleged negligence by non-
parties to the action. Read in conjunction with § 78-27-41, 
A defendant is the party against whom relief or recovery is 
sought in an action or suit. E.g., Black's Law Dictionary, 
at 377 (5th Ed. 1979). 
As a practical matter, however, a person seeking recovery 
under the Act will most often be the party bringing the 
action. 
-10-
however, it is clear that the Legislature intended that only 
the negligence of parties* to the action be apportioned. 
Section 78-27-41 provides: 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a 
party to the litigation, may join as parties any 
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective 
proportions of fault. 
Id. § 78-27-41 (emphasis supplied). Simplified, "any party 
. . . may join as parties any [non-party] defendants . . . 
for the purpose of . . . determining] their respective 
proportions of fault." Jd. The statute clearly and 
succinctly requires that a defendant be joined as a party if 
her negligence is to be considered. Had the Legislature 
intended that non-parties' negligence be considered, it 
would simply have omitted any requirement that defendants be 
joined as parties in order to have their negligence 
considered. The Legislature's language and intent must be 
respected by this Court. 
In construing a statute, all words are presumed to have 
been used advisedly. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 
428 (Utah 1989). The terms of a statute should be 
interpreted in accordance with their usually accepted 
meanings. Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). By adopting into a statute a 
A "party" to an action is the person whose name is 
designated on the record as plaintiff or defendant. E.g., 
Black's Law Dictionary, at 1010 (5th Ed. 1979). 
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word or phrase with a distinct legal meaning, the 
legislature is presumed to have intended that the meaning be 
applied by the courts in construing the statute. Greenhalgh 
v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975). 
The Legislature specifically used the term "party" in 
conjunction with the allocation of fault under the Act. The 
reason for the Legislature's choice of that term is clear: 
its intent that only parties be considered when apportioning 
negligence under the Act. See Greenhalgh, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 
1975). 
The language of § 78-27-41 is plain and unequivocal. 
It provides that any party defendant may join any other 
defendant as a party for the purpose of determining all 
parties' proportion of fault. The Legislature has thus 
expressly provided the mechanism for a tortfeasor to ensure, 
consistent with the other provisions of the Act, that she 
will only be responsible for her share of the plaintiffs 
damages• 
Any other interpretation of this section renders it 
mere surplusage; it clearly does not bestow upon plaintiffs 
or defendants any right that they do not already possess 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22. A contrary interpretation of this 
section would also conflict with the requirements of, and 
policies behind, Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
-12-
In Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah, 1984), this 
Court stated that Rules 17 and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure exist to protect the same interests: judicial 
economy and fairness to the parties in litigation. The 
Court then articulated the purpose of, and policies behind, 
these rules: 
The purpose of Rule 19(a), 'which requires the joinder 
of indispensable parties as a condition to suit, is to 
guard against the entry of judgments which might 
prejudice the rights of such parties in their 
absence'5 . . . In addition, by requiring joinder of 
necessary parties, Rule 19(a) protects the interests of 
parties who are present by precluding multiple 
litigation and contradictory claims over the same 
subject matter as the original litigation. 
Id. at 760. 
Restricting the apportionment of negligence to parties 
is wholly consistent with, and substantially furthers, these 
policies. It encourages the joinder of all potentially 
responsible tortfeasors into the initial litigation, which 
in turn ensures that no named defendant will be liable for 
more than her share of fault. It further prevents multiple 
and successive litigation by plaintiffs seeking to bind 
"ghost" tortfeasors legally for acts for which a jury finds 
them theoretically responsible. Finally, it assigns the 
risk of inaction to the party who properly should bear that 
risk. 
(citing Sanpete County Water Conservancy District v. Price 
Water Users Ass'n, 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1982)). 
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A. The Permissive "May" Does Not Affect 
Allocation of the Burden Under the Act* 
Nelson argued below that the Legislature's use of the 
word "may" in § 78-27-41 implies that joinder of a defendant 
under the Act is optional• As this Court stated in 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 575 P-2d 705, 706 
(Utah 1978), 
There is no universal rule by which directory 
provisions may, under all circumstances, be 
distinguished from those which are mandatory. The 
intention of the legislature, however, should be 
controlling and no formalistic rule of grammar or word 
form should stand in the way of carrying out the 
legislative intent. 
it it it it it 
Generally those directions which are not of the essence 
of the thing to be done, but which are given with a 
view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct 
of the business, and by the failure to obey no 
prejudice will occur to those whose rights are 
protected by the statute, are not commonly considered 
mandatory. Likewise, if the act is performed but not 
in the time or in the precise manner directed by the 
statute, the provision will not be considered mandatory 
if the purpose of the statute has been substantially 
complied with and no substantial rights have been jeopardized. 
Id. at 706 (citing 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 
25.03, at 299-300 (4th Ed.))(emphasis added). Section 78-
27-41 clearly requires the joinder of other defendants "for 
the purpose of having determined their respective 
proportions of fault." Because substantial rights of a 
person seeking recovery under the Act are at issue, the word 
"may" in § 78-27-41 is mandatory to the extent that 
defendant Nelson wishes to have other defendants' negligence 
apportioned. See Kennecott, 575 P.2d at 706. 
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This conclusion is bolstered by the Court's Kennecott 
analysis. Several courts have noted that comparative 
negligence statutes were enacted in part to alleviate the 
harshness of the contributory negligence rule upon 
plaintiffs. See Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603, 605-606 (Ore. 
1987); Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978). . 
Plaintiffs are thus 'protected' under the statute. Because 
of the very real potential, as demonstrated in this case 
below, for prejudice to a plaintiff's rights by the 
inclusion of a "ghost" tortfeasor at trial, the Legislature 
has required defendants to join as parties all other 
defendants whose negligence they wish to be considered at 
trial. 
Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that Nelson's 
argument is correct, it neither changes the analysis nor 
shifts the burden under the Act. The Legislature chose in § 
78-27-41 to place the burden upon the party seeking to have 
a non-party's negligence considered to join those defendants 
for the purpose of determining their respective proportions 
of fault. Section 78-27-41 simply and equitably assigns the 
risk of inaction to the party who should bear that risk. 
Other interrelated policy considerations lend further 
support to this argument. 
2. Policy Considerations 
Section 78-27-41 embodies the Legislature's considered 
decision to place the burden upon a defendant to ensure that 
she does not become liable for more than her proportionate 
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share of plaintiff's damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 
(1992). There are compelling policy considerations behind 
this choice. 
Foremost is fairness to the plaintiff. As amply 
demonstrated at trial below, "it is unfair to saddle the 
plaintiff with the burden of litigating liability issues of 
a non-party or to try the absent tortfeasor in absentia 
under conditions which could not bind that person under 
principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel." National 
Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662 
P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. 1983)(En Banc)(citation omitted). 
The plaintiff, conversely, may be collaterally estopped to 
deny issues litigated in the prior suit. See id.; see also 
Eurich v. Alkire, 597 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Kan. 1978) ("[A]ll 
persons who are named as parties and who are properly served 
with summonses are bound by the percentage determination of 
causal negligence." (emphasis added)).6 The Colorado 
Supreme Court also noted, again as conclusively demonstrated 
in this case, that "a comparison of the negligence of absent 
tortfeasors may work to defeat any recovery by a deserving 
plaintiff." Frackelton, 662 P.2d at 1060. 
Another factor supporting the Legislature's decision to 
place the burden upon the defendant to join other 
This principle is fully consistent with Utah law that a 
trial court may only make a legally binding adjudication 
between parties actually joined in the action. E.g., 
Hilstley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987). 
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tortfeasors is that the defendant typically possesses 
superior knowledge concerning the identity of responsible 
parties. This case is an excellent example of this 
principle. The facts supporting an action against the City 
were uniquely within Nelson's knowledge and control. 
Neither Nelson nor anyone else present at the scene the day 
of the collision reported any obstruction of the stop sign. 
This fact, in conjunction with Nelson's admittedly "vague" 
recollection of an obstruction at her deposition, made it 
difficult, if not impossible, for Turner's counsel to file 
an action against any other party in good faith. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 11. 
Further, as a matter of equity, "[i]t is preferable to 
place the burden of finding and suing absent tortfeasors on 
those who caused [the] plaintiff to suffer damages." Id.; 
see also Martinez v. First National Bank of Santa Fe, 755 
P.2d 606, 609 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)(Noting "nothing in the 
record which would have precluded defendant from joining . . 
. [the] third party defendant and thus proving his 
negligence if, indeed, there was any to be proved"). 
Closely related to these considerations is the interest 
of the Legislature in promoting judicial economy. By 
placing the burden of adding responsible parties upon the 
party with the greatest interest in having all parties• 
liability adjudicated, the Legislature has attempted to 
ensure that plaintiff's injuries will be redressed in a 
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single action. See Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah, 
1984) ; Utah R. Civ. P. 19. 
The Legislature's requirement that defendants be 
parties to the action in order to have their negligence 
considered is also consistent with the policy most often 
relied upon by courts in allowing non-parties' negligence to 
be apportioned: the premise that a tortfeasor should not be 
liable for more than her proportionate share of fault. See 
Paul v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 623 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1981); 
Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d 
399 (Idaho 1980); Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978). 
The Utah Legislature has simply chosen a more equitable 
means of achieving this goal than Oklahoma, Idaho and 
Kansas. 
Furthermore, the Oklahoma, Idaho and Kansas cases were 
all decided at least five years prior to the passage of the 
Act. It is fair to assume that the Legislature was aware of 
these cases and their reasoning, and that the Legislature 
intentionally chose not to adopt their position when 
drafting the Act. Several sister states have considered 
these cases and have also expressly declined to follow their 
reasoning. See Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603 (Ore. 1987); 
Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282 (Nev. 1984); National 
Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662 
P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. 1983)(En Banc). 
The Utah Legislature has chosen in § 78-27-41 to 
allocate the burden of spreading liability proportionately 
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to the party seeking to have the negligence of others 
considered under the Act. Compelling policy considerations 
support the Legislature's decision* The Court should honor 
that decision, 
3. Statutory Scheme 
The Act comprises a carefully considered and precisely 
worded scheme by which the comparative fault of all parties 
to an action can be assessed. The inclusion of § 78-27-41 
is clear evidence of the Legislature's intent that only 
parties to the action be considered. 
The legislative intent as expressed in the statute is 
the governing consideration when interpreting a statute. See 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 575 P.2d 705, 706 
(Utah 1978). In order to ascertain legislative intent, 
courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated 
part or parts of an act but are required to consider and 
construe the act in pari materia. See Brown v. Keill, 580 
P.2d 867, 872 (Kan. 1978). 
As noted, nothing in the first four sections of the Act 
appears to preclude a court from apportioning fault to a 
non-party to the action. When those sections are read in 
conjunction with § 78-27-41, however, the Act must be 
interpreted to prohibit the allocation of negligence to a 
defendant unless that defendant is joined as a party. 
The trial court erroneously relied exclusively upon 
§ 78-27-38, without considering the language or effect of § 
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78-27-41, or the Act's statutory scheme, in deciding to 
allow the City's negligence to be considered: 
It's my view that the purpose of No-Fault Act has to do 
with assuring that no party will be responsible to pay 
more than their appropriate share of the fault causing 
the accident, and given that overview, it seems to me 
that policy consideration behind the act, it seems to 
me that in these circumstances it's a fair request that 
Salt Lake City be considered on the apportionment 
portion of the verdict for purposes of assessing all of 
the fault that may have contributed to the cause of 
this accident • . . . 
(R. 358). By itself, § 78-27-38 arguably supports the 
court's conclusion. The court may not, however, consider 
the Act piecemeal. See Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 
428 (Utah 1989); Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 872 (Kan. 
1978). 
The plain language of § 78-27-41 mandates that a 
defendant be joined as a party before her negligence can be 
considered by the trier of fact. The policy considerations 
underlying the Act and the Legislature's statutory scheme 
support this interpretation. 
This Court is not required to accord the trial court's 
interpretation of a statute any deference, and may review 
the trial court's interpretation de novo. Asay v. Watkins, 
751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). The trial court focused upon an 
isolated section of the Act, and in so doing failed properly 
to construe the Act as written and intended by the 
Legislature. The trial court's erroneous application of the 
Act was manifestly prejudicial to Turner, and should be 
reversed. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURTS ADDITION OF THE CITY TO THE 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM THE DAY OF TRIAL WAS 
ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL 
Should the Court decide that non-parties' negligence 
may be apportioned under the Act, the Court should, in the 
interests of equity and justice, remand the case for a 
retrial and give Turner and the City the opportunity to 
litigate the case fully and fairly.7 Nelson's motion to 
add the City less than a week before trial, and the trial 
court's addition of the City the day of trial was unfair and 
prejudicial to Turner, and constituted an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. 
Utah courts have long required that amendments to the 
pleadings or the addition of parties made shortly before, or 
at, the time of trial be fair to the opposing party. See 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). This Court has 
held, in fact, that such motions are to be construed so as 
to further the interests of justice, and are to be subjected 
to much stricter scrutiny when made at, or during, trial. 
Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1971). 
In Girard, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial 
of a motion to amend to add new causes of action the day of 
trial. The Court based its affirmance upon the plaintiff's 
Because this is an issue of first impression in this State, 
Julie would respectfully request, for reasons set forth in 
this Proposition, that the Court's ruling be applied 
prospectively and that she be granted a retrial based upon 
prejudice caused by the timing of the addition of the City. 
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inability to state an adequate reason for the untimeliness 
of the motion, and upon the disadvantage ui i surprise to the 
defendant, stating that "the interests of justice will best 
be served by the court's denial of the motion to amend." Id. 
at 248 {citing Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 57 P.2d 1132 (1936)). 
Similarly, in Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), the court of appeals affirmed t he ienidl of a motion 
to add a third party defendant made two weeks before trial 
where "inadequate reasons for the untimely motion were 
presented . . . . " Id if 8^ 
In Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987), the court held that the proper standard t jr •* 
trial judge ronsi 1en ny d motion to amend is "whether the 
opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by 
having an issue adjudicated for which ho hdd not time to 
prepare." Id. at 1190 (citing Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 
664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983)). Nelson filed her motion less 
than a week before trial )hcs offered no explanation for 
her failure to add Salt Lake City as a party during 
discovery,8 and offered no adequate reason fn the delay in 
Except the conclusory allegation, without citation of 
authority, that the City could not be added under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Regardless of the accuracy of 
Nelson's statement under Utah law, Nelson's choice, at her 
peril, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41, not to join (or 
attempt to join) the City should not be allowed to work to 
Julie's prejudice. See Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 
455 (Utah 1983)(Adjudication of issue for which party had 
insufficient time to prepare constituted unavoidable 
prejudice). 
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notifying the trial court and Turner of her intent to add 
the City to the special verdict form.9 
Nelson's delay, whether the result of a tactical 
decision or a lack of diligence, should not have been 
allowed to prejudice Turner and deny her any recovery for 
her injuries. The interests of justice would best have been 
served by the trial court's denial of the motion to amend to 
add the City six days before trial. Girard v. Appleby, 660 
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). The trial court clearly abused 
its discretion. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT REBUTTAL TESTIMONY 
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
The trial court compounded its error in adding the City 
the day of trial by subsequently prohibiting Turner from 
presenting witness Jim Nakling's ("Nakling") rebuttal 
testimony. Nakling would have directly controverted 
Nelson's testimony that the stop sign was obstructed, and 
would have nullified or minimized her assault against the 
CI., for example, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5 (1992 Cum. 
Supp.), which requires that a party file notice within 
ninety (90) days of the filing of the complaint of her 
intent to have the negligence of non-parties considered. 
The party must identify the non-party's name and last-known 
address, or "the best identification of such nonparty which 
is possible under the circumstances, together with a brief 
statement of the basis for believing such nonparty to be at 
fault." Failure to designate the nonparty within the 
specified time precludes consideration of the nonparty's 
alleged negligence. Colorado thus expressly recognizes the 
potential for abuse by a party "laying behind the log" until 
discovery has concluded (or the statute of limitations has 
run) and then seeking to add an "empty chair" to shift the 
blame to at trial. 
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newly-added "ghost" tortfeasor, the City. Nakling's 
testimony was clearly proper rebuttal testimony intended to 
meet new evidence in the case, and Nelson would have 
suffered no demonstrable prejudice from its introduction. 
Rebuttal evidence is that which tends to refute, or to 
so modify or explain as to nullify or minimize the effect 
of, the opponent's evidence. Board of Education of South 
Sanpete School District v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980). 
Rebuttal is a term of art, denoting evidence introduced by a 
plaintiff to meet new facts brought out in his opponent's 
case in chief. Morgan v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 
606 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1979)(emphasi s ori ginaJ ); see a 1so 
Soliz v. Ammerman, 395 P.2d 25 (Utah 1964)(Rebuttal evidence 
should be confined to proof which answers or explains an 
adversary's evidence). Rebuttal evidence is designed to 
meet facts not raised prior to the defendant's case in 
chief, not facts which could have been raised, Id *t 5ljli. 
:;• Rodriguez v. Olin Corp., 780 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 
1986), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court's refusal in allow rebuUal testimony in 
response to defendant's expert's testimony. In its 
decision, the court discussed the rules and considerations 
governing the admission or denial of rebuttal testimony. 
The court held that rebuttal evidence should be allowed 
where "new" testimony is presented during defendant s rase 
in ohiet The court stated that 
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Logic and fairness lead us to conclude that new 
evidence for purposes of rebuttal does not mean "brand 
new." Rather, evidence is new if, under all the facts 
and circumstances, the court concludes that the 
evidence was not fairly and adequately presented to the 
trier of fact before the defendant's case in chief. 
Id. at 496. The court pointed out that a plaintiff only 
bears the burden of proving a prima facie case, and is not 
required to "prove the negative" of defendant's facts or 
theories: 
This rule proceeds from the view that a plaintiff has 
the right to adduce whatever evidence is necessary to 
establish its prima facie case and is under no 
obligation to anticipate and negate in its own case in 
chief any facts or theories that may be raised on 
defense. 
Id.: accord, Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d 
1055 (7th Cir. 1987). The court held that the defendant's 
expert's "corrosion fatique entrapment" testimony was "new," 
that the plaintiff had no cause or duty to go forward in its 
case in chief and negate that testimony, and that the 
district court's exclusion of the plaintiff's proffered 
rebuttal testimony was improper and prejudicial. Id. The 
court reversed and remanded the case. 
Witness Nakling's proffered testimony was clearly 
proper rebuttal evidence that should have been admitted by 
the trial court. See Barton, 617 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1980). 
It was offered to refute Nelson's testimony that the stop 
sign was obstructed, and to controvert the testimony of 
Nelson's expert, who testified that, due to the obstruction, 
Nelson could not reasonably have been aware that she needed 
to stop. Nelson and her expert's testimony was 
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unquestionably "new" evidence which Turner was under no 
obligation to anticipate and negate in her case in chief. 
Rodriguez, 780 F.2d at 496- Moreover, it is undisputed that 
the substance of Nakling's testimony had not adequately been 
presented to the jury prior to Nelson's case in chief. See 
id.; see also Everett v. S.H. Parks & Associates, Inc., 697 
F . 2 d 2 5 0 , 2 5 2 ( 81h C ir. 19 8 3) (p 1 a ii 11: i £ f ' s rebu11a 1 evidenc e 
"was not truly relevant until [defendant] presented its 
defense"). Turner was thus effectively prevented from 
offering any evidence that the sign was not obstructed. The 
trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Nakling 
from testifying. 
Nelson's obstruction testimony was not the only "new" 
bit of evidence faced by Turner at trial. The presence of 
t he C i t y a s a " gho s 1: "1" t o r t £ e a s o i:, ma de kn own t o Tu i n e i j ust 
minutes before opening statements, constituted "new" 
evidence of monstrous dimensions. The entire thrust of 
Nelson's case changed from contesting her own negligence to 
proving the alleged negligence of Salt Lake City, without 
the City present to respond to or defend those al legations. 
Turner was required to respond not just to new evidence, but 
to new issues raised against a new party* 
Moreover, the admission of Nakling's testimony *ou UJ 
have caused no demonstrable prejudice to Nelson, Turner's 
counsel offered to continue the trial or to allow Nelson to 
depose Nakling at: her convenience i n order to prepare cross-
examination. See State v. Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515, 519 (Utah 
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1989)(Additions to the witness list should be permitted 
where good cause is shown. "[G]ood cause must certainly be 
construed to include . . . evidentiary matters developed 
during the presentation of the case of either party, matters 
which require clarification or rebuttal by that party"). 
Nelson further could not have been prejudiced by the 
nature of Nakling's testimony. Nelson presented two 
witnesses who testified that the sign was obstructed. 
Nakling's testimony simply controverted Nelson's witnesses, 
and clearly went to the weight, not the admissibility, of 
the evidence. The jury should have been permitted to hear 
both sides of the story. 
Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the 
court's denial of Turner's rebuttal evidence was manifestly 
unfair and patently prejudicial, and constituted a clear 
abuse of discretion. The court's ruling should be reversed, 
and the case should be remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Turner respectfully requests 
that the trial court's rulings be reversed, and that the 
case be remanded for a new trial consistent with Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-41 and the case law cited herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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